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By staging his investiture, Gbagbo was thus openly challenging international public opinion, as well as a part of national public opinion. His stubborn and provocative stance was perhaps not unexpected from a man who had begun his political career as a staunch opponent of the then apparently untouchable regime of Félix HouphouëtBoigny.
Moreover, Gbagbo's antagonistic stance towards the international community, particularly
France and the UN, had several precedents since the conclusion of the 2003 Linas
Marcoussis agreement (Piccolino 2012), which had brought a shaky end to violent conflict between his regime and the FN. In public discourses, the Gbagbo regime claimed to break away from the shackles of 'special relationship' with France and the Western block, which had been a building block of previous regimes (Akindès 2004; Bouquet 2011; McGovern 2011) .
One could thus have expected Gbagbo to stress the problem of national sovereignty in his speech at the oath ceremony, or to present himself as a champion of anticolonialism and African dignity, as he had done on other occasions. Instead, the selfstyled president chose to open his speech with another theme:
Today, I understand better why there are so many crises in Africa… What I would like to stress today is that these crises come out also from the fact that people are outlaw. People do not like to respect the law and the procedures that stem from it. There is no strong State, no strong Republic without laws and procedures… The only strong Republic is the one that stands on the rules of the law. Since I have become president, I have realized that all the crises that we have known have come out from the non respect of the law, of the jurisdiction and of the procedures [la loi, le droit et les procédures] that this law produces. However, we cannot claim that we are building democracy and put aside the law and the procedures stemming from it (Fraternité Matin 6.09.2010, italicised by the author of this article).
The words 'loi' ('law'), 'droit' ('right', but also synonymous of law in French), 'procédures' (procedures) recur in an almost obsessive fashion in this speech, especially in connection with democracy. And, in a subsequent speech where he expressed his views on the postelection crisis, Gbagbo continued to insist that 'all the troubles that we are witnessing today in Côte d'Ivoire have come out from the refusal of my rival to abide by the laws, the rules and the procedures applicable in our country' (Gbagbo 2010) .
One may perhaps wonder why a man who had in the past challenged the existing order as a political opponent should devote so much space to the argument of the law and of the legal order. Researchers have labelled the Gbagbo regime's ideology as 'ultranationalist', 'anticolonialist', 'nativist', 'ethnonationalist', 'populist' (Arnaut 2008; Banégas 2006; Cutolo 2010; MarshallFratani 2006) , but despite an abundant literature dedicated to Ivorian nationalism, the legalistic dimension of this nationalism has received little attention. Moreover, the problematic and ambiguous role of the law in Côte d'Ivoire's recent history has been downplayed by the international and human rights organizations' insistence over the necessity to restore the 'rule of law' (Hellweg 2013; Bovcon 2013 ).
Francis Akindès, however, has nevertheless noticed that, during the political transition that 4 followed the 2002 shortlived civil conflict, a legalistic interpretation of democracy occupied a central place in the public discourse of Gbagbo's party Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and of the former president's supporters (Akindès, 2010) .
This article discusses possible links between ultranationalism and a legalist, formalist conception of democracy and national sovereignty, looking at the Ivorian case and Africa more broadly. My argument is that the concept of 'legal command' and its role in African politics, as theorized in the work of Pierre Englebert, provide a useful framework to understand the centrality of the law in the Gbagbo's regime political discourse. However, for understanding the emergence of Gbagbo's legalist ultranationalism one has also to integrate factors that are specifically Ivorian in the explanation. Moreover, the role of legalism in African politics should also be understood in the context of The law and the supreme law -the Constitution -are one of the prime formal institutions of a modern state. 'Neopatrimonial theory' -the dominant, although contested paradigm to the study of African politics -posits that the African states are characterized by coexistence of formal institutions and formal rules on the one hand, and informal behaviour on the other. 2 This interaction provides rent opportunities for political elites and thus access to the state is highly sought and prized.
In practice, however, scholars of African politics have paid more attention to informal institutions as such than to their interaction with formal ones. Concepts such as 'personal rule' (Jackson & Rosberg 1982a) , 'Big Man rule' (Posner & Young 2007) , 'economy of affection' (Hyden 2005) or 'instrumentalisation of disorder' (Chabal and Daloz 1999) have dominated the debate over African politics. The view that the State in Africa is a mere façade and that 'legitimacy is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons' (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 16) or in a 'cultural matrix' revolving around metaphors of family and food (Schatzberg 1993) makes difficult to understand how the law and the Constitution may occupy a central place in the discourse of African political elites.
The neglect of the influence of the law seems also motivated by the acknowledgement that it does not play in Africa the role of limitation of the arbitrary character of power that is inscribed in Western conceptions of democracy. The practitioners of international institutions and NGOs routinely deplore the weak development of the rule of law in Africa and in other parts of the developing world and develop projects aimed at strengthening it. The UN, for example, have a dedicated interagency working group on rule of law and most current and recent UN peace operations in Africa have included a 'rule of law' section. 3 On another level, however, the acknowledgement that African reality is dominated by informalization prompts another question: why do formal and legally defined institutions, particularly the state, persist in spite of their apparent inefficacy?
More than twenty years ago, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (Jackson 1990; Jackson & Rosberg 1982b) tried to respond to this question by drawing attention to the 'juridical' character of Africa's states and of their sovereignty. According to Jackson, most 6 African states issued from decolonization were not endowed with full 'empirical sovereignty' at independence, i.e. the capacity to hold the monopoly of force over territory.
Nevertheless, the international system had conferred to these states a 'juridical sovereignty' that allowed them to persist in spite of their evident shortcomings.
Jackson's arguments have been considerably nuanced by other scholars (Clapham 1998; Herbst 2000; Krasner 1999 Englebert's concept of legal command finds an expression in many instances, such as the production of official certifications and identity documents, the printing of currency, the right to seize public resources. The definition of the access to citizenship is perhaps the more powerful dimension of this authority, as citizenship grants access to the other benefits that legal command may provide.
'Legal command' is crucial to understand the functioning of neopatrimonial systems. It offers opportunities for rent seeking not only to the main power holders, but also to the many local authorities, state agents and intermediary actors that are dominated and dominant at the same time. The fact that these authorities embody the legitimacy of the state, defined in legal terms, becomes crucial to their capacity to extract rents even in the absence of administrative effectiveness and coercive capacities. The centrality of 'legal command' implies thus an essentially instrumental view of the law, which becomes a tool to exercise power over others, often in the pursuit of private gain, rather than an instrument for limiting the state's arbitrary power. The 'rule of law' is overcome by the 'rule by law'.
Englebert argues that there is a link between juridical sovereignty and legal command on the one hand and the emergence in Africa of a particular type of nationalism.
This nationalism is deprived of the liberating qualities attributed to the assertion of national identity by much early literature on Africa's nationalism (Young 1986 ). First, this 8 nationalism is diversionary and is agitated by the elites in power for neutralizing internal and international threats to their domination. Its aim is to imprint the state's external sovereignty into the hearts and minds of African citizens, in order to make the juridical state appear natural and divert the blame for development failure (Englebert 2009: 198 199) . Thus, elitedriven nationalism in Africa tends to be self serving and instrumental, rather than to lay the ground for a political project of emancipation and development.
Englebert observes, however, that nationalism is also produced at the grassroots level.
In fact, what gives to legal command its resilience and its force is the fact that its benefits are diffused within the society. However, 'this type of nationalism arises from competitive contact with others from the same country, it is solitary and mutually alienating, rather than the expression of the bonds of the community' (Englebert 2009: 204) .
Although this article will focus mainly on the diversionary use of nationalism at the elite level, the concept of 'solitary nationalism' seems particularly appropriate to make a sense of some troubling characters of the Ivorian proGbagbo movement of the 'young patriots' (Arnaut 2008; Banégas 2006; Cutolo & Banégas 2012; Koné 2011) . Research carried among the patriots has frequently highlighted the extreme factionalism that characterized the movement (Cutolo & Banégas 2012; Koné 2011) , which is all the more impressive given the absence of substantial ideological differences among groups and factions. These factional struggles make sense only by looking at the competition among patriots for the benefits distributed by the Gbagbo regime and for the monopoly of the 'patriotic' label, which granted access to additional material and moral goods: thus, for the appropriation of power and resources that stems from the legitimacy that only association with the state may confer. For understanding the rise of an ultranationalist legalist discourse in Côte d'Ivoire one has also to consider the context of economic recession and state decay that the country experienced since the end of the HouphouëtBoigny 's regime. Englebert observes that a radicalization of nationalism, leading to the emergence of forms of 'nativist nationalism' (Bøås 2009; Dorman, Hammet, Nugent 2007 ) is more likely to emerge in a situation of shrinking state patronage, where some groups try to bar to other groups the access to citizenship and to the legal command that stems from it. He also argues that the importance of 'legal command' is connected to the crisis of the state in its capacity to control effectively the national territory and implement its policies. The more a state is able to exercise effective control, the less it is obliged to insist on its legality. Ultranationalist HouphouëtBoigny took the Constitution seriously, in so far as it recognized to it an important legitimizing role and saw it as an instrument to consolidate his power. The
Ivorian Constitution was not a brake on government action but could work as an accelerator (Alexander 1963) .
Although these remarks suggest that HouphouëtBoigny was already aware of the importance of legal command, it shall also be remarked that he never relied primarily or exclusively on the appeal of legalism for legitimizing his rule. His political ability in defusing any threat to his rule, the economic successes of his regime and his capacity to readapt Akan traditional notions of legitimate rule (Maddox Toungara 1990) were equally keys. Moreover, HouphouëtBoigny 's system of personal rule was very much condoned at the internal and international level, at a time were authoritarianism and one party rule were seen as necessary elements in a process of nation building. Thus, HouphouëtBoigny 's legitimacy was not continuously questioned due to the democratic deficit of his regime, nor was he obliged to justify his actions with reference to any notion of democracy. While all this is well established, lesser remarked is the fact that the manipulation of democracy in Côte d'Ivoire has taken place to a large extent on the legal and constitutional terrain, through the manipulations of the key rules of eligibility and voting right (Bouquet 2011; Bovcon 2013) . Differently from HouphouëtBoigny, Bédié, Gueï and Gbagbo were forced to give a cloth of democratic legitimacy to their rule and saw in the appeal to the law a possible way out. The resort to the manipulation of the law and especially of the Constitution -the supreme law -allowed those who controlled the state to claim allegiance to the formal rules of democracy, while they were violating its substance.
Bédié was the first to sponsor an amendment of the electoral code in order to prevent his rival Alassane Ouattara from running in the elections, introducing the obligation to be born 'from an Ivorian mother and father' for the presidential candidates.
The usage of the law to distort the democratic game reached its peak in 2000 under the military transition guided by Gueï, when a new Constitution was submitted to referendum (Bouquet 2011) . Its article 35 dealt with eligibility to the presidency, and would create a longtime debate in Ivorian politics. Often accused to be 'ivoiritaire' ('Ivoritarian'), the article was formulated in terms so vague and broad that it could be invoked to justify the 13 exclusion of almost any candidate. 5 As a matter of fact, it served to prevent twelve candidates out of seventeen from taking part to the 2000 elections, including those issued from two of the three Ivorian major political parties, the PDCI and the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) headed by Ouattara. 6 Although Gbagbo eventually won, the exclusion of several major candidates and the turmoil that accompanied his election were going to weight heavily on his legitimacy as new Ivorian president.
While these debates over the eligibility to the presidency went on, another debate was opened by the FPI about the necessity of 'cleaning' the electoral lists from the alleged presence of foreigners and provided the rationale for the launch of a controversial process of identification of the population after Gbagbo's election (Banégas 2006; MarshallFratani 2006) . In this context, the FPI relied on the argument of legalbureaucratic rationalization to justify its stance. FPI militants claimed to be advocating the respect of the law in a domain -that of immigration -where since HouphouëtBoigny illegality and informalization had allegedly prevailed. They explicitly denied that immigration could be seen as a political, rather than legaladministrative, question (Campbell 2003: 37) . Richard Under the leadership of young former student leader Guillaume Soro, who would prove a skilled politician, the rebels organized politically. In their discourse, they claimed to be fighting against ivoirité and the Gbagbo regime's xenophobia (Gadou 2009; Fofana 2011 ). In their own defence, the members of the Gbagbo regime put forward an opposite interpretation of the crisis and of the rebellion. While the FN insisted that their rebellion should be seen as the outcome of longterm grievances, Gbagbo's supporters were rather pointing to the proximate causes of the insurgency. They painted the rebellion as a 'foreign terrorist attack', sponsored by Alassane Ouattara and by 'rogue states' of the subregion such as Burkina Faso. 8 The political and identitybased grievances of the FN were disqualified as pretexts for covering the insurgents' quest for power and wealth. However, the rebellion started soon to be portrayed also as illegal in its essence, as an attack against the 'juridically sovereign' state of Côte d'Ivoire.
During the first months of the crisis, the nationalist virulence of the Ivorian regime seemed moderated by the acknowledgement that the international community, particularly
France and the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS), were to some extent responsive to its arguments and condemned the use of force by the part of the rebels (ECOWAS 2002). 9 Gradually, however, ECOWAS' and France's decision to push for a negotiated solution to the crisis, which implied the at least partial recognition of the grievances of the rebels, prevailed. It was this new approach that informed the Linas Thirdly, the legalist argument was a way to reject the decisions taken at an international level by discussing their place in the legal order, rather than their substance. In this sense, legalist arguments were in part crafted for the international community. The fact that they were employed by top Ivorian state officials on the national media and that the exaltation of the Constitution featured prominently in the young patriots' discourses at popular 'agoràs'
and 'parlements' (reference) suggest however that they were equally important in addressing the Ivorian internal public. In November 2004, the launch by the Gbagbo regime of Opération Dignité -a campaign of air strikes on the rebelcontrolled North -and the turmoil that followed, including clashes between the French army and the Ivorian young patriots, interrupted for some time the political dialogue. After the return to normalcy, the discussion over the reform of article 35 resumed under the mediation of Thabo Mbeki. Because of his reputation of anticolonialist hero, the president of South Africa enjoyed the confidence and sympathy of the presidential side, which enabled him to obtain some important concessions. In December 2004, the FPI parliamentary group approved the amendment of the article, but continued to insist that a referendum was needed to finalize it.
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Why did the proGbagbo camp insist so much over the need to amend the Constitution by referendum? Several reasons were behind the proGbagbo request. First, given the difficulty to organize a referendum in a country cut in half, with a contested electoral list, the insistence over a referendum allowed for time and postponed the resolution of the crisis and the date of the presidential elections. Second, the FPI wanted to relaunch its longtime request to make the disarmament of the FN the precondition for constitutional reform, as it asked at least a partial demilitarization of the North for holding the referendum. However, as suggested by Affi N'guessan's argument that the reform of the Constitution was not within the authority of the president, the insistence over the amendment rules was also a way for Gbagbo to escape responsibility by appealing to 'the law'. This attitude may be seen, for instance, in Gbagbo's replies to an interview from the 2. For recent discussions of neopatrimonialism, see Erdmann and Engel (2007) and Bach and Gazibo (2012) . 
